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EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION 
LOWE v. CITY OF MONROVIA: NINTH 
CIRCUIT ADOPTS A FLEXIBLE 
INTERPRETAION OF THE McDONNELL 
DOUGLAS TEST 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In Lowe v. City of Monrovia; the Ninth Circuit held that 
an unsuccessful Black woman applicant for a job as a city police 
officer established a prima facie case of racial discrimination 
under Title VIP by showing that the city's hiring practices were 
suspect.3 The city's use of delayed effective dates for eligibility 
and its use of eligibility lists that expire, as well as comments 
made by the Personnel Manager that suggested an attempt to 
discourage Black and female applicants, raised triable issues of 
discriminatory motive.· 
The Ninth Circuit reversed and remanded the district 
court's decision granting summary judgment to the City of Mon-
rovia with respect to the race discrimination claims brought 
under Title VII and 42 U.S.C. section 1981 G and section 19838 
1. 775 F.2d 998 (9th Cir. 1985), amended. 784 F.2d 1407 (9th Cir. 1986) (per Rein-
hardt, J.; the other panel member3 were Preger3on, J., and Schwarzer, D.J., United 
States District Judge for the Northern District of California, sitting by designation, dis-
senting in part). 
2. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Title VII, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e - 2000e-17 (1982). Title VII 
prohibits discrimination in employment on the basis of race, color, religion, sex or na-
tional origin. See infra notes 24 to 28 and accompanying text for a discussion of Title 
VII. 
3. Lowe, 775 F.2d at 1009. 
4.ld. 
5. 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1982) (prohibits racial discrimination in the making and enforc-
ing of contracts). See infra notes 44 to 50 and accompanying text for a discussion of § 
1981. 
6. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982) (prohibits interference with an individual's constitutional 
89 
1
Leitner: Employment Discrimination
Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1987
90 GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 17:89 
and the sex discrimination claim brought under 42 U.S.C. sec-
tion 1983.7 The court approved the district court's dismi~sal of 
the Title VII and section 1981 sex discrimination claims.8 
II. FACTS 
Kathryn Lowe, a Black woman graduate of a police officer 
training program, applied for an entry level position on the 
Monrovia police force in January of 1982.8 At the time she ap-
plied, there was an opening for an entry level police officer and 
there were no Blacks or women on the force. 10 
While the City of Monrovia ("City") accepted police officer 
applications at all times, applicants who passed a written and 
oral examination were placed on a ranked eligibility list which 
became effective at a later date.ll The eligibility list automati-
cally expired six months after its effective date.12 The City also 
maintained a separate list of lateral entry candidates. 13 
Lowe passed the required examinations by May 28, 1982, 
and was notified on June 3, 1982, that she was accepted for the 
eligibility list which took effect on August 1, 1982.14 Lowe 
claimed that during her oral examination the Personnel Division 
Manager, Betty Logans, informed her that the City's police force 
had no Blacks, no women, and "no facilities."l& She then sug-
gested that Lowe apply for a position in Los Angeles where the 
department was "literally begging for minorities and especially 
rights by state and local governments}. See infra notes 51 to 52 and accompanying text 
for a discussion of § 19a:~. 
7. Lowe, 775 F.2d at 1011. 
8. [d. 
9. [d. at 1002. 
10. [d. 
11.Id. 
12. [d. 
13. Id. It is unclear how the list of lateral entry candidates is compiled. It is also 
unclear when the City hires laterally for an entry level position instead of hiring from the 
list of entry level recruits. However, most. entry level positions are filled by recruits 
rather than by experienced officers. Id. 
14. Id. The candidates were ranked according to their test scores. Lowe ranked 
number eleven on the list. She offered evidence purporting to show that. she should have 
been ranked second on the list. The court did not. specify what. evidence Lowe produced. 
[d. at. 1002, 1007 n.7. 
15. Id. at 1002. 
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females. "16 
On June 7, 1982, four days after Lowe was notified that she 
had qualified for the eligibility list but before that list went into 
effect, Louis Razo was hired laterally for the entry level open-
ing.17 The eligibility list that included Lowe automatically ex-
pired on February 1, 1983, and there were no further openings 
for entry level police officers during the time in which Lowe's 
name appeared on the eligibility list. IS 
Lowe filed a complaint against the City with the Equal Em-
ployment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) on June 18, 1982.18 
The complaint subsequently was amended on June 24, 1982.20 
After receiving a right to sue letter from the EEOC, Lowe 
brought an action in the district court for discrimination based 
on race and sex.21 
The district court dismissed Lowe's Title VII sex discrimi-
nation action.22 The court then granted the City's motion for 
summnry judgment with respect to Lowe's Title VII race dis-
crimination claim and her race and sex discrimination claims 
under sections 1981 and 1983.23 
16. Jd. at 1002-03. The C(>urt accepted Lowe's version of her conversation with 
LogaM, and it pointed Ollt ti.at when reviewing an order granting summary judgment to 
the defendant, it is required to view the facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. 
Jd. at 1003 n.1. 
17. Jd. at 1003. 
18. Jd. at 1002. The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) is em-
powered to investigate and eliminate through voluntary agreement any employment 
practice prohibited by Title VII. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5. 
19. Lowe, 775 F.2d at 1003. The first complaint included Logans' statement encour-
aging Lowe to apply to the Los Angeles police department instead. The amended com-
plaint included the information the Louis Raw was hired laterally for the position. Jd. 
20. Jd. 
21. Jd. If the EEOC has not been able to obtain voluntary compliance with the 
party charged with unlawful discrimination, it must notify the charging party that a civil 
action can be brought by the party. Typically, notification is achieved by issuing a right 
to sue letter to the chMging party. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e·5. 
22. Lowe, 775 F.2d at 1003. The district court dismissed the Title VII sex discrimi-
nation claim because Lowe failed to file a complaint for sex discrimination with the 
EEOC. Jd. 
23. Jd. 
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III. BACKGROUND 
A. TITLE VII 
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits discrimi-
nation in employment on the basis of race, color, religion, sex or 
national origin.24 The 1972 amendment extends coverage under 
the act to include state and local government employees.25 The 
objective of Congress in enacting Title VII was to achieve equal-
ity of employment opportunities and to declare, as a national 
policy, the protection of the rights of individuals to be free from 
such discrimination.28 
The Act established the Equal Employment Opportunity 
Commission which is empowered to investigate unlawful em-
ployment discrimination charges.27 If the EEOC is unable to ob-
tain voluntary compliance with Title VII through conference, 
conciliation and persuasion, a civil action may be brought by the 
party bringing the complaint.28 
The Supreme Court first articulated the "disparate impact" 
theory of employment discrimination in Griggs v. Duke Power 
CO.21) In Griggs, the court held that Title VII prohibited not only 
24. Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 253 (1964) (codified lIB amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 
2000e - 2000e-17 (1982». § 2000e-2 reads in part: 
Id. 
(a) It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an em-
ployer -
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to du.charge any individual 
or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with re-
spect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of 
employment, because of such individual's face, color, religion, 
sex, or national origin •..• 
25. Pub. L. No. 92-261, 86 Stat. 103 (1972) (codified lIB amended at 42 U.S.C. § 
2000e (1982». 
26. H.R. REP. No. 914, 88th Congo 2nd Sese. (1964) reprinted in 1964 u.s. CODE CONGo 
& AD. NEWS 2355, 2401. 
27. 42 U.s.C. § 2000e-5 (1982). 
28. Id. The EEOC must first attempt to obtain voluntary compliance with Title VII 
Crom the party charged with unlawful discrimination by engaging in informal methods of 
conference and negotiation. If this is unsucessful, civil action may be brought against the 
party by either the EEOC or the party bringing the complaint. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5. 
29. 401 U.S. 424 (1971). Black employees at a generating plant challenged their em-
ployer's alternative requirement of a high school diploma or the passing of an intelli-
gence test as a condition of employment. Id. at 427-28. The Supreme Court held that 
4
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overt discrimination, but also practices which are neutral on 
their face, but have a discriminatory impact upon individuals 
and groups protected under Title VII.30 In a disparate impact 
case, an employee must show that a facially neutral employment 
practice has a significant discriminatory impact upon individuals 
and groups protected by Title VII.s1 Once an employee demon-
strates that an employment practice has a disparate impact 
upon a protected person, the employer has the burden of show-
iU3 that the practice is justified by business necessity.32 In order 
to prove a disparate impact case, the plaintiff usually must pro-
duce statistical evidence that shows that an employer has hired 
members of a protected class in a smaller proportion than their 
representation in a pool of eligible candidates.33 
Another theory used to bring employment discrimination 
cases is the "disparate treatment" theory. Employment discrimi-
nation claims based on disparate treatment can be distinguished 
from claims based on disparate impact. In disparate treatment 
cases, the employer simply treats some individuals less favorably 
than others because of their race, color, religioIi, sex or national 
origin.34 In disparate impact cases, the employer's practice is 
Title VII prohibited an employer from requiring specific testing or education require-
ments which operate to exclude Blacks unless the requirements are shown to be related 
to job performance. Id. at 436. 
30. Id. at 431. Title VII protects individuals and groups from discrimination based 
on race, color, religion, sex or national origin. See supra note 24 and accompanying text. 
31. Moore v. Hughes Helicopters, Inc., 708 F.2d 475,481 (9th Cir. 1983) (citing Con-
necticut v. Teal, 457 U.S. 440,446, (1982». In Moore, a Black female aerospace employee 
brought a class action suit for race and sex discrimination based on disparate impact. 
The court held that the employee's disparate impact claim failed because she did not 
produce statistical evidence demonstrating that the percentage of Black females hired 
was disproportionate to the pool of eligible applicants. Id. at 484-86. 
32. Gay v. Waiters' and Dairy Lunchmen's Union, 694 F.2d 531, 537 (9th Cir. 1982) 
(citing Contreras v. City of Los Angeles, 656 F.2d 1267, 1275-80 (9th Cir. 1981». In Con-
treras, although statistics proved that a city auditor examination had a disparate impact 
on Spanish surnamed persons, the court found that the examination was justified by 
business necessity. 656 F.2d at 1267. 1275-80. For a discussion of Gay, see infra text 
accompanying notes 123-24. 
33. 708 F.2d at 482. "Disparate impact should always be measured against the ac-
tual pool of applicants or eligible employees unless there is a characteristic of the chal-
lenged selection device that makes use of the actual pool of applicants or eligible em-
ployees inappropriate." Id. 
34. International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. U.S., 431 U.S. 324,335-36 n.15 (l977) 
(8 common carrier and a union discriminated against Blacks and Spanish surnamed 
truck drivers). In disparate treatment cases, proof of discriminatory motive is critical, 
although it can often be inferred from differences in treatment. Either theory may be 
applied to a particular set of facts. Id. See generally, B. seHLEI AND P. GROSSMAN, EMPLOY-
5
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facially neutral but falls more harshly on members of a pro-
tected class. U 
In }.lcDonnell Douglas v. Green," the Supreme Court set 
forth the elements and the allocation of proof required to prove 
employment discrimination based on disparate treatment.37 The 
first step requires the plaintiff to establish a prima facie case of 
disparate treatment by proving the following four elements: (1) 
that the plaintiff belonged to a class protected by Title VII; (2) 
that the plaintiff applied and was qualified for the job for which 
the employer was seeking applicants; (3) that despite being qual-
ified, the plaintiff was rejected; (4) that after the plaintiff's rejec-
tion, the position remained open and the employer continued to 
seek applicants from persons of comparable qualifications.31J 
Once these elements are met, the burden shifts to the em-
ployer to articulate a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for 
the employee's rejection. a. In the final step, the burden shifts 
back to the plaintiff to show that the employer's sta~d nondis-
criminatory reason is actually a pretext for unlawful 
discrimination.40 
A prima facie case of disparate treatment can also be made 
without satisfying the McDonnell Douglas elements.41 The legal 
standard to be applied is simply whether the facts are sufficient 
MENT DISCRIMINATIOn LAW (2nd ed. 1983). 
35. Teamster3, 431 U.S. at 335-36 n.15_ 
36. 411 U.S. 792 (1973). The plaintiff, a Black mechanic, alleged that he was refused 
employment as a rehire because of his race and his involvement in civil rights activitie3. 
The Court held that the plaintiff e3tablished a p:ima facie case of racial discrimination 
by satisfying the four elements outlined by the court.ld_ at 802. The case was remanded 
in order to give the plaintiff the chance to show that the reason for his rejection was 
pretext. ld. at 804. See infra text accompanying notes 37-40 for a discussion of the te3t 
outlined in McDonnell Douglo.&. 
37. ld. at 802. 
38. ld. The facta will vary in Title VII cases and the four elements of prima facie 
proof are not nece388rily applicable in every re3pect to differing !actualsituations.ld. at 
802 n.13. 
39. ld. at 802. 
40. ld. at 804. Evidence relevant to showing pretext includes evidence of the em-
ployer's prior treatment of the employee and the employer's policy and practice regard-
ing minority employment. Statistical evideneto is also helpful in demonstrating pretext. 
ld. at 804-05. 
41. Gay v. Waiters' and Dairy Lunchmen's Union, 694 F.2d at 550. "We have re-
peatedly emphasized that proof of the four McDonnell Douglas criteria is not the only 
way to establish a prima facie case of disparate treatment •••• " ld. 
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for the court to infer that the employment decision was more 
likely than not the product of intentional discrimination.42 All 
evidence, both direct and circumstantial, statistical and non-
statistical, relevant to the question of discrimination can be used 
to establish a prima facie case.u 
B. 42 UNITED STATES CODE SECTIONS 1981 AND 1983 
Title 42 of the United States Code, section 1981, which pro-
hibits racial discrimination in the making and enforcing of con-
tracts, originated with the 1870 Civil Rights Act.44 The Supreme 
Court in Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, Inc.41 established 
that section 1981 affords a federal remedy for employment dis-
crimination on the basis of race.4 ' The Johnson court further 
stated that Title VII and section 1981 afford overlapping and 
independent remedies for racial discrimination.47 The Ninth Cir-
cuit in Gay v. Waiters' and Dairy Lunchmen's Union41 stated 
that a section 1981 claimant must show diScriminatory intent,4SI 
and that the same standards used to prove a Title VII disparate 
treatment claim may be used to prove a section 1981 claim. &0 
Section ] 983, which protects an individual's constitutional 
42. Id. 
43. Id. See auo Diaz v. American Telephone and Telegraph. 752 F.2d 1356. 1361 
(9th Cir. 1985) (circumstantial and statistical evidence); O'Brien v. Sky Chefs. Inc.. 670 
F.2d 864. 866 (9th Cir. 1982) (statistical evidence); Lynn v. Regents of the University of 
California. 656 F.2d 1337, 1342-43 (9th Cir. 1981) (statistical evidence). 
Id. 
44. 42 U.s.C. § 1981 reads: 
All persons within the jurisdiction of the United States sba1l 
have the snme right in every State and Territory to make and 
enforce contracts. to sue, be parties, give evidence, and to the 
full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the se-
curity of persons and property as is enjoyed by white citizens, 
and shall be eubject to like punishment, pains, penalties, 
taxes. licenses and exactions of every kind. and to no other. 
45. 421 U.S. 454 (1975). In Johmon. a Black railroad worker alleged that he was 
discharged becau.'Ie of his race. Id. at 457. The court held that § 1981 affords a separate 
federal remedy against employment discrimination based on race and that the filing of 
an EEOC complaint did not toll the statute of limitations on the plaintiff's section 1981 
claim. Id. at 460, 466. 
46. Id. at 459-60. 
47. Id. at 461. 
48. 694 F.2d. 531. 
49. Id. at 537. 
SO. Id. at 538. 
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rights by providing a cause of action against state and local gov-
ernments, is a codification of the 1871 Civil Rights Act. ~1 The 
same inquiry used in a Title VII disparate treatment claim may 
also be used in a section 1983 claim involving employment 
discrimination. ~2 
IV. THE COURT'S ANALYSIS 
A. THE MAJORITY 
The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of 
Lowe's Title VII sex discrimination claim.u The court relied on 
Shah v. Mt. Zion Hospital & Medical Center/'· which held that 
when a plaintiff fails to raise a Title VII claim before the EEOC, 
the district court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to hear it. ~~ 
Because the plaintiff's amended EEOC complaint did not allege 
discrimination on the basis of sex, the court concluded that the 
district court correctly dismissed this cause of action.68 
In its analysis of Lowe's Title VII race discrimination claim, 
the court first examined Lowe's claim that the City's hiring 
Id. 
51. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 reads in relevant part: 
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regu-
lation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the Dis-
trict of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citi-
zen of the United States or other person within the 
jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, 
or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be 
liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or 
other proper proceeding for redress. 
52. See Tagupa v. Board of Directors, 633 F.2d 1309, 1312 (9th Cir. 1980). Plaintiff 
responded to an advertisement for a Pacific Area Specialist but never completed the 
application process and was later rejected. The court applied the four McDonnell Doug-
las elements to the plaintiff's sections 1981 and 1983 claims and concluded that since he 
did not complete the application process, he failed to establish a prima facie case of 
employment discrimination. Id. 
53. Lowe, 775 F.2d at 1004. 
54. 642 F.2d 268 (9th Cir. 1981). An East Indian male who was terminated as a 
payroll clerk filed an EEOC complaint alleging sex and national origin discrimination. At 
trilll, the plaintiff expanded his Title VII action to include race, color and religious dis-
crimination, and the court held that since these claims were not brought before the 
EEOC, they were properly dismissed. Id. at 270-72. 
55.Id. 
56. LOUIe, 775 F.2d at 1004. Lowe's amended EEOC complaint explicitly stated: "I 
feel the sole reason for my denial of the job is because 1 am Black." The amended com-
plaint did not allege discrimination on the basis of seL Id. 
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practices had a disparate impact on Blacks. &7 The court relied 
on Moore v. Hughes Helicopters, Inc.&S to assert that a proper 
statistical record must be shown in order to prevail under a dis-
parate impact theory. &11 Since Lowe did not offer statistical evi-
dence to show that the City's use of eligibility lists with delayed 
effective dates had a disparate impact on Blacks, the court con-
cluded that Lowe failed to establish a prima facie case of dispa-
rate impact.so 
The court then applied the McDonnell Douglas test to de-
termine whether Lowe established a prima facie case of racial 
discrimination based on disparate treatment.sl In applying the 
four elements of McDonnell Douglas to the facts of this case, 
the court found that the first element, that plaintiff belonged to 
a protected class, was met since Lowe, a Black woman, was a 
member of a minority protected by Title VII.sS The third ele-
ment, that plaintiff was rejected despite being qualified, was also 
met because Lowe passed the oral and written examination 
which qualified her for the position, and she was rejected by the 
City.s3 The court then addressed the issue of whether Lowe met 
the second element, that the plaintiff applied and was qualified 
for the job for which the employer was seeking applicants.84 
Since there was a job opening on the police force when Lowe 
first submitted her application, the court reasoned that this re-
57. Id. Lowe alleged that the City's policy of using eligibility lists with delayed ef-
fective dates and that automatically expire, along with the practice of using lateral hires 
to fill entry level positions, had a disparate impact on Blacks. She contended that these 
practices resulted in a disproportionately low number of job offers to Blacks, regardless 
of the City's motivation. Id. 
58. 708 F.2d 475. The Moore court explained: "The best evidence of discriminatory 
impact is proof that an employment practice selects members of a protected class in a 
proportion smaller than their percentage in the pool of actual applicants." Id. at 482. 
The court also noted that in some respects the requirements the plaintiff must meet are 
more exacting than those of a disparate impact plaintiff. Id. 
59. Lowe, 775 F.2d at 1004. 
60. Id. at 1004 & n.3. Lowe did not offer affidavits or documentary evidence to sup-
port her claim. Her assertions were made by memoranda of law and not by way of prof-
fered facts. Id. at 1004. The only racial breakdown of applicants offered by Lowe was for 
the year 1982. The court found that this was not a proper statistical record. Id. at 1004 
n.3. 
61. Id. at 1005. 
62. Id. 
63. Id. Both Lowe and the City agreed that Lowe met the first and third elements of 
the McDonnell Douglas test. Id. The City argued that Lowe failed to meet the second 
and fourth elements. Id. 
64.Ia. 
9
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quirement was met. U At this point, the court refused to consider 
the City's contention that Lowe did not "apply, for the purposes 
of the McDonnell Douglas criteria," until her name was placed 
on an active eligibility list, and that there were no job openings 
during the time that her name was on the list." The court rea-
soned that this evidence should be saved for the rebuttal stage.87 
The final element, that after plaintiff's rejection the position re-
mained open and the employer continued to accept applications, 
was satisfied because the City essentially rejected Lowe when 
the eligibility list on which her name appeared expired on Feb-
ruary 1, 1983, and continued to accept applications from other 
qualified candidates after this date." The court concluded that. 
Lowe satisfied the four elements of the McDonnell Douglas test, 
thereby establishing a prima facie case of racial discrimination 
based on disparate treatment. U 
Under the McDonnell Douglas analysis, once Lowe estab-
lished a prima facie case of employment discrimination, the bur-
den shifted to the City to articulate a legitimate nondiscrimina-
tory reason for not hiring her.'7O To meet its burden, the City was 
only required to set forth a legally sufficient explanation for re-
jecting Lowe's application.'71 The court found that the City met 
its burden by explaining that its practice of maintaining eligibil-
ity lists with delayed effective dates was a long-standing nondis-
criminatory practice.7I 
65. Id. at 1006. The court noted that the second element related only to whether 
there was an opening either when the plaintiff applied or at any time her application was 
pending.ld. 
66. Id. at 1005. 
67. Id. at 1006. "[TJhe order of proof set forth in McDonnell Douglas does not per-
mit us to consider rebuttal evidence at the prima facie case stage." Id. 
68. Id. The court rejected the City's contention that the automatic expiration of the 
eligibility list on February I, 1983, did not constitute a rejection. Id. 
69. Id. The court used the term "prima facie case" to denote the rebuttable pre-
sumption that a plaintiff must establish as the first step in a Title VII case, and not to 
denote the plaintiff's burden in putting on a case-in-chief. Id. at 1006 n.5. See Texas 
Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 254 n.7 (1981) (defining 
"prima facie case" for the purposes of the McDonnell Douglas test). 
70. Lowe, 775 F.2d at 1007. 
71. Id. See Burdine, 450 U.S. at 254-55. 
72. Lowe, 775 F.2d at 1007. The court acknowledged that there may be administra-
tive constraints which justify the City's use of eligibility lists with delayed effective dates 
and automatic expiration dates, and it assumed arguendo, that the City met its burden. 
Id. However, the court rejected the City's argument that it was justified in not hiring 
Lowe because she was only number eleven on the eligibility list. It noted that regardless 
of where Lowe ranked on the list, she eventually would have been offered a job if the 
10
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Under the final step of the McDonnell Douglas analysis, the 
burden shifted back to Lowe to show that the City's nondiscrim-
inatory reasons were pretextual.73 To prove pretext, Lowe con-
tended that the City's rules that permit the manipulation of job 
openings and hiring lists are themselves suspect and raise the 
issue of discriminatory motive,7. and she attempted to support 
this contention by introducing statistical data.7~ Although the 
court rejected Lowe's statistical data as inadequate,76 it noted 
that the same evidence used to establish a prima facie case may 
be used to show that the defendant's explanation was pretex-
tual77 and it concluded that she sufficiently raised a factual issue 
as to the City's motive in refusing to hire her.78 
The court next considered whether Lowe established a 
prima facie case of disparate treatment by providing direct and 
circumstantial evidence of the City's discriminatory motive. The 
court relied upon International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. 
U.8.,79 which stated that a prima facie case of disparate treat-
ment can be made independent of the McDonnell Douglas ele-
ments by the production of evidence which is adequate to infer 
that an employment decision was based on unlawful discrimina-
tion.80 The court added that very little direct evidence is needed 
in order to raise a factual issue as to the employer's motive.81 
The Personnel Manager's statements to Lowe that there were no 
Blacks or women on the Monrovia police force and her encour-
aging Lowe to apply for a position in Los Angeles instead of 
Monrovia, when viewed with the fact that no Blacks were em-
City did not use eligibility lists that expire after six months and did not occasionally hire 
laterally. Id. at 1007 n.7. 
73. Id. at 1008. See Burdine, 450 U.S. at 255-56. 
74. Lowe, 775 F.2d at 1008. 
75. Id. Lowe claimed that six Blacks qualified on the eligibility list between 1979 
and 1982 but none were hired. She also claimed that the City "held over" non-Blacks 
from entry level eligibility lists and hired them later. Id. See supra note 57. 
76. Lowe, 775 F.2d at 1008. 
77.ld. 
7B. Id. See Burdine, 450 U.S. at 255 n.10; Diaz, 752 F.2t;1 at 1363 n.B. The court 
emphasized that an employer's true motive in an employment situation is not easy to 
discern and that the question of an employer's intent to discriminate should be left to 
the trier of fact. Lowe, 775 F.2d at 1008-09. 
79. 431 U.S. 324. 
SO. Id. at 358. "[A)ny Title VII plaintiff must carry the initial burden of offering 
evidence adequate to create an inference that an employment decision was based on a 
discriminatory criterion illegal under the [Civil Rights) Act." Id. 
81. Lowe, 775 F.2d at 1009. 
11
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ployed by the Monrovia Police Department at the time Lowe 
applied, were found by the court to be sufficient evidence of dis-
criminatory motive to establish a prima facie case.82 
Finally, the court concluded that Lowe established a prima 
facie case of disparate treatment both by satisfying the McDon-
nell Douglas test and by introducing actual evidence of the Per-
sonnel Manager's statements, which inferred a discriminatory 
motive on the part of the City.83 Therefore, the court held that a 
genuine issue of material fact had been raised and summary 
judgment was the incorrect remedy.84 
In its analysis of Lowe's section 1981 and 1983 claims, the 
court found that because section 1981 redresses only discrimina-
tion based upon race, Lowe's section 1981 sex discrimination 
claim was properly dismissed by the district court.81i In address-
ing Lowe's section 1981 race discrimination claim, the court re-
lied upon Gay v. Waiters' and Dairy Lunchmen's Union,s8 
which stated that the same standards are used to prove racial 
discrimination under both Title VII and section 1981.87 The 
court concluded that the evidence presented by Lowe in her Ti-
tle VII action was sufficient to allow her to bring an action for 
race discrimination under section 1981.88 
In addressing Lowe's section 1983 sex discrimination claim, 
the court relied upon Patsy v. Board of Regents,89 which held 
82. ld. at 1007. "One clear inference that could reasonably be drawn from [the Per-
80nnel Manager's] .•. statement is that the Monrovia police force was not begging 
for-or even interested in-such applicants." ld. at 1009. 
83. ld. at 1009. 
84. Id. at 1009-10. 
Once a prima facie case is established either by the intro-
duction of actual evidence or reliance on the McDonnell 
Douglas presumption, summary judgment for the defendant 
will ordinarily not be appropriate on any ground relating to 
the merits because the crux of a Title VII dispute is the 'elu-
sive factual question of intentional discrimination.' 
ld. at 1009 (quoting Burdine, 450 U.S. at 255 n.8). 
85. Lowe, 775 F.2d at 1010. 
86. 694 F.2d 531. 
87. Id. at 538. 
88. Lowe, 775 F.2d at 1010. 
89. 457 U.S. 496 (1982). A female employee who was rejected from thirteen positions 
at a university filed an action under § 1983 alleging employment discrimination based on 
race and sex. The Fifth Circuit found that the employee was required to exhaust admin-
12
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that a plaintiff does not have to exhaust state administrative 
remedies before bringing an action under section 1983.~ The 
court then determined that Lowe's failure to file an EEOC sex 
discrimination complaint did not bar her section 1983 sex dis-
crimination claim.81 The court concluded that the evidence used 
by Lowe to establish her Title VII action was sufficient for her 
to also bring an action for race and sex discrimination under sec-
tion 1983.82 
B. THE DISSENT 
Judge Schwarzer, dissenting in part, argued that Lowe did 
not make out a prima facie case of dispara treatment under Mc-
Donnell Douglas.83 Judge Schwarzer maintained that the second 
McDonnell Douglas element, that Lowe applied and was quali-
fied for the job for which the City was seeking applicants, was 
not met since the job opening was filled before Lowe became 
eligible and there were no job openings during the time Lowe's 
name was on the eligibility list.H He further argued that since 
Lowe was only number eleven on the eligibility list, this pre-
cluded the inference that the City's failure to hire her was based 
on discriminatory motivation.811 
istrative remedies. ld. at 498. The Supreme Court reversed this decision. ld. 
90. ld. at 516. 
91. Lowe, 775 F.2d at 1011. The court reasoned that since it was not necessary to 
exhaust administrative remedies before bringing an action under section 1983, Lowe'lI 
failure to file an EEOC sex discrimination complaint did not bar her section 1983 claim. 
ld. 
92.ld. 
93. ld. at 1012. 
94. ld. Judge Schwarzer relied on Gay v. Waiters' and Dairy Lunchmen's Union, 694 
F.2d 531 (black waiters who failed to show that they applied for positions prior to the 
filling of a known vacancy were not qualified applicants); Chavez v. Tempe U. High 
School District #213, 565 F.2d 1087 (9th Cir. 1977) (a school teacher who applied for a 
chairperson position after it was filled was not a qualified applicant); and Morita v. 
Southern Cal. Permanente Medical Group, 541 F.2d 217 (9th Cir. 1976) (an x-ray techni-
cian was not qualified to fill an open position due to lack of training) for the proposition 
that the plaintiff must OIl a qualified applicant when the job opening existed. Lowe, 775 
F.2d at 1013. 
95. Lowe, 775 F.2d at 1013. At oral argument, the City's counsel stated that the City 
was obligated to hire from the first three names on the list only. Since the only issue 
raised was the filling of the vacancy in June of 1982, the dissent rejected the majority 
argument that if the lists didn't automatically expire, the City would have had to hire 
Lowe eventually. regardless of her rank. ld. at 1013 n.2. See supra note 72. 
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Contrary to the majority's position, Judge Schwarzer ac-
cepted the City's hiring rules as racially neutral. 96 He then ques-
tioned the majority's logic in finding the City's hiring rules to be 
racially neutral under the disparate impact analysis and racially 
suspect under the disparate treatment analysis.517 Since there 
was no showing that the City acted other than in accordance 
with its own rules and practices, Judge Schwarzer argued that 
Lowe produced no evidence of disparate treatment.51! Thus, even 
though the comments of the Personnel Manager encouraging 
Lowe to apply in Los Angeles may have been perceived as evi-
dence of discriminatory motive, Judge Schwarzer maintained 
that this was insufficient to establish a prima facie case in the 
absence of evidence of disparate treatment.1I1I 
Finally, the dissent noted that the system of ranking appli-
cants on eligibility lists which have a limited life is a common 
practice for public agencies and that this case may create a pre-
cedent that could threaten the integrity of the civil service hir-
ing system. 100 
V. CRITIQUE 
The Lowe court correctly held that the plaintiff failed to 
prove a prima facie case of disparate impact because her statisti-
cal data was inadequate. In order to prove a prima facie case of 
disparate impact, the plaintiff usually must offer statistical proof 
that an employer hired members of a protected class in a smaller 
proportion than is represented in a statistical pool of qualified 
candidates. lol Statistical evidence from an extremely small pool 
has little predictive value and should be disregarded.los The only 
96. Jd. at 1013. Judge Schwarzer contended that since the majority found the City's 
hiring practices racially neutral under the disparate impact analysis, the practices must 
be accepted as racially neutral under the disparate treatment analysis unless there was 
strong evidence that the City acted other than in accordance with its rules and practices. 
Id. 
97. Jd. at 1013 n.4. "It is difficult to follow the majority's logic under which these 
same practices, held to be neutral under the impact analysis, are held to raise an infer-
ence of disparate treatment." Id. The dissent cited no authority to show that the major-
ity's holding was legally impermissible. 
98. Jd. at 1014 n.5. 
99. Jd. at 1014. 
100. Jd. at 1012, 1014. See Cal. Govt. Code §§ 18900-18954, 19050-19062. 
101. Moore v. Hughes Helicopters, In:-., 708 F.2d at 482. 
102. Morita v. Southern Cal. Permanente Medical Group, 541 F.2d 217, 220 (9th 
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statistical evidence provided by Lowe was evidence showing that 
between 1979 and 1982, six Blacks applied and were rejected. lo3 
Since her sample was extlemely small and she failed to produce 
statistics showing the number of qualified Blacks in the area, the 
court properly found that Lowe's statistical record failed to es-
tablish a prima facie case of disparate impact. 
Judge Schwarzer, in his dissent, questioned how the major-
ity could find that the City's hiring procedures were neutral 
under a disparate impact analysis but suspect under a disparate 
treatment analysis.104 However, an examination of several Su-
preme Court cases reveals that a finding of disparate treatment 
does not depend on a prior finding of disparate impact. In Inter-
national Brotherhood of Teamsters,105 the Supreme Court 
stated that a company's system wide practices and procedures 
can be reviewed under either analysis.loe Furthermore, the Su-
preme Court in Furnco Construction Corp. v. Waters l01 held 
that although the plaintiffs failed to establish a prima facie case 
of disparate impact, they did establish a prima facie case of dis-
parate treatment under McDonnell Douglas.loa In Fumco, the 
court found that the superintendent's practice of hiring only 
bricklayers known to him was evidence of discriminatory treat-
ment, despite the fact that this was a long-standing industry 
practice which was considered "racially neutral" under the im-
pact analysis.l~ Accordingly, the Ninth Circuit was correct in 
asserting that Lowe's ability to show that the City's hiring prac-
tices were discriminatory under a disparate treatment analysis 
was not dependent on her proving disparate impact. 
Cir. 1976). In an action brought by an oriental x-ray technician alleging denial of a pro-
motion on the basis of race, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of 
the plaintiff's claim. Id. at 219. The courat foune that the plaintiff's use of only eight 
persons in his statistical analysis is much too small to have any predictive value and 
should be disregarded. Id. at 220. 
103. Lowe, 775 F.2d at 1008. 
104. Id. at 1013 n.4. 
105. 431 U.S. 324. 
106. Id. at 335 n.15. 
107. 438 U.S. 567 (1978). 
108. Id. at 575. The Supreme Court stated that the proper approach in this case is 
the disparate treatment analysis contained in McDonnell Douglas. Id. The Court ap-
peared to foreclose on remand the Court of Appeals' finding of no disparate impact. Id. 
at 583. The implication is that the Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeal's finding 
of no disparate impact. 
109. Id. at 572. 
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The dissent also challenged the court's finding that Lowe 
satisfied the second McDonnell Douglas element.1l0 In order to 
meet the second element, Lowe had to show that she applied 
and was qualified for a current open position on the City's police 
force. The dissent maintained that Lowe failed to meet this ele-
ment because at the time the position was filled, Lowe was not 
yet eligible to be hired because her name did not appear on an 
effective eligibility list.111 
In order to evaluate both the majority's and the dissent's 
positions, it is helpful to consider the rationale behind the Mc-
Donnell Douglas elements and to examine several Ninth Circuit 
cases which specifically address the second element. The ration-
ale of the McDonnell Douglas four part test is that it requires 
the applicant to demonstrate that his or her rejection was not 
due to the most common, legitimate reasons an employer may 
use to reject an applicant: the lack of qualifications or the ab-
sence of an opening in the job sought.1l2 The elimination of 
these reasons is generally sufficient, absent a valid explanation, 
to create an inference that. the hiring decision was discrimina-
tory.us The McDonnell Douglas test is not intended to be an 
inflexible formulalU and the prima facie proof required will vary 
in different factual situations.11II However, it is evident from the 
cases that the existence of a job opening is critical to show a 
prima facie case. U8 
The Ninth Circuit has articulated guidelines for meeting the 
second McDonnell Douglas element, or the "job opening" re-
quirement, in several recent cases. In Chavez v. Tempe Union 
High School,117 the court held that an English teacher who was 
denied a position as department chairperson failed to satisfy the 
job opening requirement because the position was already filled 
at the time she applied.u8 The Chavez court formulated a clear 
standard which requires the existence of a job opening at the 
110. Lowe, 775 F.2d at 1013. 
111. 1d. at 1012. 
112. Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 358 n.44. 
113. 1d. 
114. Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 358. 
115. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802 n.13. 
116. See McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802; Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 358 n.44. 
117. 565 F.2d 1087 (9th CiT. 1977). 
118. 1d. at 1092. 
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time that the application is submitted. 1111 
The court in McLean v. Phillips-Ramsey,120 however, 
adopted a more flexible standard for meeting this requirement. 
In McLean, the court found that a Black artist who was denied 
an advertising position satisfied the job opening requirement 
even though the opening did not occur until one month after he 
completed the application. l2l Under the McLean job opening 
test, there must be a job opening within a reasonable time after 
the application is made.122 
The court's interpretation of the job opening requirement in 
Gay v. Waiters' and Dairy Lunchmen's Unionl23 is more strin-
gent than the Chavez and McLean interpretations. In Gay, the 
court found that four Black waiters who were denied hotel 
waiter positions failed to satisfy the job opening requirement be-
cause they could not establish that they applied for positions 
immediately before specific job openings were filled. l2f In Gay, 
the court added a new requirement to the job opening test. Not 
only must there be a job opening at the time the application is 
made, but the applicant must be "eligible" to fill the opening by 
meeting the employer's time-line for eligibility.1J5 
The dissent in Lowe applied the more stringent Gay inter-
pretation of the job opening requirement. It argued that Lowe 
did not satisfy this requirement because she was not eligible to 
fill the position since her name was not on the City's eligibility 
list.12II However, the majority applied the more flexible Chavez 
and McLean interpretation and concluded that Lowe met this 
requirement regardless of her eligibility since there was an open-
ing at the time she applied.127 
119. ld. at 1092. 
120. 624 F.2d 70 (9th Cir. 1980). 
121. ld. at 72. 
122. ld. at 72. 
123. 694 F.2d 531. 
124. ld. at 548. Although there were numerous openings during the years that the 
waiters applied, the employer's standard hiring practice was 10 hire only waiters who 
applied within a few days of an opening, and the openings were often unadvertised. ld. 
at 535. 
125. ld. at 547·48. 
126. Lowe, 775 F.2d at. 1012·13. 
127. ld. at 1006. 
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The majority's flexible interpretation of the job opening re-
quirement is a more appropriate approach than the stringent re-
quirement articulated in Gay. The Supreme Court has empha-
sized that the McDonnell Douglas requirements were not 
intended to create an inflexible rule that is applied in a rigid 
manner.128 Furthermore, under the more stringent Gay interpre-
tation, an employer could manipulate the timing of eligibility for 
particular job openings to prevent minority applicants from be-
ing hired. This type of discriminatory treatment is the very 
practice that Title VII legislation was designed to eradicate.129 
Therefore, the Lowe court was correct in applying the more flex-
ible interpretation of the job opening requirement. 
The dissent expressed concern that the holding in Lowe 
would threaten the established civil service hiring system. The 
majority did not seriously examine this contention. However, it 
did suggest that adherence to a civil service hiring system alone 
would not afford a basis for finding disparate treatment, but 
that the manner in which the hiring system was applied in a 
given case might raise the issue of discriminatory intent.13o The 
Lowe court thus demonstrated the importance of scrutinizing 
each employment decision on an individual basis regardless of 
the particular hiring practice used. The court also recognized 
that the need to eliminate employment discrimination may 
supercede the need to protect established hiring practices. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The Ninth Circuit properly found that Lowe established a 
prima facie case of employment discrimination by satisfying the 
McDonnell Douglas test and by introducing statements of the 
Personnel Manager which indicates evidence of a discriminatory 
motive by the City. By using a flexible approach to the McDon-
128. Fumco, 438 U.S. at 575·77 (the formula suggested in McDonnell Douglas was 
never intended to be rigid, mechanized or ritualistic); Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 358 (the 
McDonnell Douglas elements did not purport to create an inflexible formulation); Me· 
Donnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802 n.13 (the prima facie proof required may differ with 
differing factual situations). 
129. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. at 431. "What is required by Congress [in 
enacting Title VII] is the removal of artificial, arbitrary, and unnecessary barriers to 
employment when the barriers operate invidiously to discriminate on the basis of racial 
or other impermissible classification." [d. 
130. Lowe, 775 F.2d at 1009 n.9. 
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nell Douglas job opening requirement and by scrutinizing both 
the employment decision and the hiring system underlying the 
decision, the Ninth Circuit faithfully upheld the purpose of Title 
VII: the elimination of employment practices which operate to 
classify employees on impermissible grounds. 
Marcia Leitner· 
• Golden Gate University School of Law, Class of 1988. 
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EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION 
SUMMARY 
PROCTOR V. CONSOLIDATED 
FREIGHTWAYS CORPORATION OF 
DELAWARE: AN EMPLOYER'S OBLIGATION 
TO MAKE A GOOD FAITH EFFORT TO 
ACCOMMODATE AN EMPLOYEE'S 
RELIGIOUS BELIEFS 
1. INTRODUCTION 
In Proctor v. Consolidated Freightways Corporation of Del-
aware/ the Ninth Circuit held that an employee who was dis-
missed for failing to report for work on the Sabbath established 
a triable issue of fact as to whether her employer's actions con-
stituted religious discrimination under Title VII. t The court 
found that statements made by Proctor's supervisors, that they 
did not have to accommodate her at her new position, raised the 
issue of whether her employer made a good faith effort to ac-
commodate her religious beliefs prior to terminating her.3 
As an employee of Consolidated Freightways Corporation, 
plaintiff Corine Proctor held several clerical positions from 1968 
1. 795 F.2d 1472 (9th Cir. 1986) (per Alarcon, J.; the other panel members were 
Reinhardt, J., and Thompson. J.) 
2. ld. at 1473. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits an employer from 
discriminating against an employee on the basis of religion. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e - 2000e-
17 (1982) 
3. Proctor, 795 F.2d at 1473 
109 
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until her termination in 1981.4 In 1977, Proctor became a mem-
ber of the Seventh-Day Adventist Church. The church teaches 
its members to observe the Sabbath from sundown Friday to 
sundown Saturday and prohibits its members from working on 
the Sabbath. In her position as a data input clerk, Proctor was 
required to work overtime occasionally on Saturdays. On De-
cember 12, 1977, Proctor was notified that she was required to 
work the following Saturday and she responded by sending Con-
solidated a letter stating that her religious beliefs precluded her 
from working on Saturdays.1i When she failed to report to work 
that Saturday, she was placed on a five day suspension. After 
Proctor filed a grievance with the company's Grievance Commit-
tee, the Manager of Labor Relations for Consolidated instructed 
Proctor's supervisor to accommodate her religious beliefs by not 
requiring her to work on Saturdays.' Consolidated successfully 
accommodated Proctor for the next three years by substituting 
other data input clerks when Saturday work was required.7 
On May 7, 1981, Proctor bid for a balancing clerk position 
at Consolidated. Although she refused to sign a statement ac-
knowledging that she might be required to work on Saturdays if 
she accepted the position, Consolidated nevertheless awarded 
her the position.' Proctor began working as a balancing clerk on 
May 18, 1981. On May 28, Proctor's supervisor informed her 
that she was required to work overtime on Saturday, May 30, 
and Proctor indicated that she was unable to do so because of 
her religious beliefs.1I Consolidated obtained volunteers to work 
overtime during the week and was successful in avoiding Satur-
day overtime for all the balancing clerks. The same sequence of 
events occurred the week of September 12, 1981, and Consoli-
dated again avoided Saturday overtime for the balancing clerks 
py having volunteers work overtime during the week. The same 
sequence of events occurred the following week, and when Proc-
tor failed to show up for work on September 19, she was sus-
pended without pay for three days. Proctor was then scheduled 
to work on Saturday, September 26, and she again notified her 
4.Id 
5.Id 
6. Id. at 1474 
7.Id 
8.Id 
9.Id 
21
Leitner: Employment Discrimination
Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1987
1987] EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION 111 
supervisor that she was unable to do so. When she failed to re-
port to work on the 26th, Consolidated terminated her 
employment. 10 
Proctor filed grievances with the company and the arbitra-
tor ruled against her.u The arbitrator found that Proctor caused 
her own problem by bidding for a job which required Saturday 
overtime work and that Consolidated had no additional duty to 
accommodate her in her new position.1J Proctor then filed a 
complaint in the district court for violation of Title VII. IS The 
district court relied on the magistrate's findings and granted 
summary judgment for Consolidated.14 The magistrate found 
that Consolidated had a duty to reasonably accommodate Proc-
tor's religious beliefs after she became a balancing clerk, but 
that Consolidated had adequately shown that accommodation 
could not be made without undue hardship and that there were 
no triable issues of material fact remaining.lII Proctor appealed 
to the Ninth Circuit. Ie 
II. THE COURT'S ANALYSIS 
A. BACKGROUND 
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits an em-
ployer from discriminating against an employee or prospective 
employee on the basis of his or her religio:n.17 The statute de-
fines "religion" as including "all aspects of r~~igious observance 
and practice, as well as belief, unless an employer demonstrates 
10.ld 
11.ld 
12. Id. Proctor subsequently tiled an employment discrimination complaint with the 
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC). When conciliation efforts failed, 
the EEOC issued a notice of right to sue. ld 
13.ld 
14.ld 
15. Id. at 1474-75 
16. Id. at 1473 
17. 42 U.S.C. §§2000e - 2000e-17 (1982). §2OOOe-2(a) reads in relevant part: 
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer -
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any 
individual, or otherwise to discriminate against 
any individual with respect to his compensetion, 
terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, 
because of such individu8J's race, color, 
religion, sex, or national origin .••• 
22
Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 17, Iss. 1 [1987], Art. 10
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol17/iss1/10
112 GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [VoL 17:109 
that he is unable to reasonably accommodate to an employee's 
or prospective employee's religious observance or practice with-
out undue hardship on the conduct of the employer's 
business. "18 
In Anderson v. General Dynamics Convair Aerospace Divi-
sion, II the Ninth Circuit articulated guidelines for establishing a 
prima facie case of religious discrimination under Title VII. so To 
establish a prima facie case, the plaintiff has the burden of 
pleading and proving that (1) she had a bona fide religious be-
lief; (2) she informed her employer of her religious views and 
that they were in conflict with her responsibilities as an em-
ployee; and (3) she was discharged because of her observance of 
that belief. II Once the employee has established a prima facie 
case, the burden shifts to the employer to prove that it made 
good faith efforts to accommodate the employee's religious be-
liefs. S2 The employer must also demonstrate that it was unable 
to accommodate the employee's beliefs without undue hard-
ship.1S The burden to take the initial steps towards accommoda-
tion is on the employer.'· 
B. DISCUSSION 
The Ninth Circuit first found that Proctor established a 
prima facie case of discrimination under Anderson by showing 
that (1) she had a bona fide belief that working on SatUrday was 
contrary to her religious faith; (2) she informed Consolidated of 
her religious views and that they were in conflict with working 
18. 42 U.S.C. f 2000e(j) 
19. 589 F.2d 3ffl (9th Cir. 1978). In Anderson, an employee whose religious beliefs 
prevented him from joining a union and paying union dues was terminated by his em-
ployer. The court held that the employer and the union failed to prove that they were 
unable to reasonably accommodate the employee's religious beliefs without undue hard-
ship. [d. at 399 
20. [d. at 401 
21. Proctor v. Consolidated Freightways Corp. of Del, 795 F.2d at 1475 (citing An-
derson v. General Dynamics Convair, 589 F.2d at 401) 
22. Anderson, 589 F.2d at 401 
23. Burns v. Southern Pacific Transportation Co., 589 F.2d 403, 406 (9th Cir. 1978). 
Burns also involved an employee whose religious beliefs prevented him from belonging to 
a union and paying union dues. The court held that the employer and the union failed to 
prove that good faith efforts to accommodate the employee's religious beliefs were made 
and that no accommodation could be made without undue hardship. [d. at 404-05 
24. Anderson, 589 F.2d at 401 
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overtime on Saturdays; and (3) she was discharged for her fail-
ure to report for work on a Saturday. J& 
The court next examined whether Consolidated made a 
good faith effort to accommodate Proctor's religious beliefs.J8 As 
a threshold matter, the court found that Consolidated had a 
duty under Title VII to make good faith efforts to accommodate 
Proctor in her new position as a balancing clerk, and the fact 
that Proctor applied for a position requiring Saturday work did 
not exempt Consolidated from its statutory duty.t7 The court 
also stated that the issue of whether an employer met its burden 
to initiate good faith efforts to accommodate an employee's be-
liefs is a question of fact. u 
Turning to each party's arguments, the court noted that 
Consolidated maintained that it made successful good faith ef-
forts to accommodate Proctor's religious beliefs during the week 
of May 30 and September 12, when it avoided Saturday over-
time for all the balancing clerks. U Consolidated also asserted 
that it made similar efforts to accommodate Proctor on Septem-
ber 19 and September 26 which proved unsuccessful.ao Finally, 
Consolidated maintained that its efforts to accommodate Proc-
tor at her previous position were relevant in establishing that it 
made a good faith effort to accommodate her in her new posi-
tion.al Proctor acknowledged that on four occasions, Consoli-
dated made attempts to secure volunteer overtime workers to 
avoid Saturday overtime for the balancing clerks.as However, she 
disputed Consolidated's motives in doing so, and she argued 
that those actions did not amount to good faith efforts to accom-
modate her beliefs.3lI To support her allegation, she submitted 
an affidavit which stated that at the arbitration hearing, her su-
pervisor and the Manager of Labor Relations for Consolidated 
both testified that the company did not have to accommodate 
her at grade 3 (her balancing clerk position) because they were 
25. Proctor, 795 F.2d at 1475 
26.Id 
27. Id. at 1476 
28.Id 
29. Id 
30.Id 
31. Id. at 1477 
32. Id. at 1476 
33.Id 
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accommodating her at grade 2 (her data input clerk position).H 
Her affidavit also stated that Mr. Kowalski of Consolidat.ed told 
her that the company would not make any effort to accommo-
date her at grade 3 because they were accommodating her at 
grade 2.stI 
Mter examining both party's arguments, the Ninth Circuit 
held that Proctor's allegations of discriminatory motive, sup-
ported by her testimony of her superiors' statements, raised a 
triable issue of fact as to Consolidated's motive in attempting to 
avoid Saturday overtime and whether its actions constituted 
good faith efforts to accommodate Proctor's religious beliefs." 
The court also found that Consolidated's efforts to accommodate 
Proctor in her previous position might constitute admissible evi-
dence with respect to Consolidated's motives, but that these 
prior efforts did not constitute compliance with its duty to ac-
commodate Proctor in her present position. S7 Since there was a 
triable issue of fact concerning whether Consolidated undertook 
good faith efforts in accommodating Proctor in her new position, 
the court found it unnecessary to reach the question of whether 
Consolidated was unable to accommodate Proctor's beliefs with-
out undue hardship." 
Proctor had requested attorney's fees in the event that she 
succeeded on appeal. S. The Ninth Circuit relied on Hanrahan v. 
Hampton40 in denying her fee request without prejudice because 
Proctor had not prevailed on the merits of her claim and had 
established only that she was entitled to a trial.41 
34.Id 
35. Id. Mr. Kowalski's position at Consolidated is not explained by the court 
36. Id. at 1477. The court relied on Proctor's testimony that (1) her supervisors at 
Consolidated believed that they were under no obligation to accommodate her in her 
new position as a balancing clerk, and (2) Kowalski's statement that Consolidated would 
not make any effort to accommodate her in her new position. Id 
37.Id 
38. Id. at 1475 n.1 
39. Id. at 1478. Proctor's request for attorney's fees was pursuant to 42 U.s.C. § 
200Qe·5(k), which states: "In any action or proceeding under this subchapter the court, 
in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party, other than the Cotnmill8ion or the 
United States, a reasonable attorney's fee as part of the costs •••• " 
40. «6 U.S. 754, 758-59 (1980). In Hanrahan, the Supreme Court reversed a fee 
award because plaintiffs had not prevailed on the merits of any of their claims and had 
established only that they were entitled to a trial. ld. at 758-59 
41. Proctor v. Consolidated Freightways Corp. of Del., 795 F.2d at 1478-79 
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III. CONCLUSION 
In Proctor, the Ninth Circuit held that the plaintiff raised a 
material issue of fact as to whether her employer made a good 
faith effort to accommodate her religious beliefs.4:I This case 
demonstrates the court's reluctance to dismiss by summary 
judgment Title VII discrimination suits in which motive and in-
tent are crucial elements.u This ruling signifies that if there is 
any disputed evidence concerning whether an employer's mo-
tives constitute a good faith effort to accommodate an em-
ployee's religious beliefs, this issue will be reserved for a trier of 
fact. 
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